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Abstract: Functional Cognitive Disorder (FCD) is a common diagnosis at the memory clinic. FCD is
characterised by significant self-reported cognitive symptoms in the absence of external evidence
of cognitive dysfunction. A potential explanation for this is a deficit in metacognition, the process
by which we internally judge our own abilities. Here we investigated differences in accuracy,
confidence, and metacognition between people with FCD (N = 20), neurodegenerative mild cognitive
impairment (nMCI; N = 14), and healthy controls (N = 23). The groups were assessed on forced choice
memory and perceptual tasks, with trial by trial confidence ratings. FCD and nMCI participants
showed lower accuracy on the memory task (means FCD 63.65%, nMCI 63.96%, HC 71.22%), with
a significant difference between the FCD and HC groups after controlling for age and sex. There
were no between-group differences in memory task confidence (means FCD 3.19, nMCI 3.59, HC
3.71). The FCD group showed greater confidence when longer time was allowed on the memory
task. No between group differences in perceptual task accuracy (means FCD 63.97%, nMCI 64.50%,
FCD 65.86%) or confidence (means FCD 3.71, nMCI 3.43, HC 3.88) were found. No differences
in metacognitive efficacy emerged between the groups, either on the memory or perceptual task
(Memory Meta-d’/d’:FCD 0.63, nMCI 0.94 HC 0.85; Perceptual Meta-d’,d’: FCD 0.50, nMCI 0.51,
HC 0.72). Participants showed greater metacognitive efficacy on the memory task compared to
the perceptual task. The difficulties experienced by people with FCD do not appear to be due to
metacognitive deficits. Their performance was similar to people with nMCI over aspects of the
memory tasks, which suggests that the primary issue may lie with memory encoding or retrieval,
rather than with their judgement of performance accuracy.
Keywords: metacognition; insight; anosognosia; functional cognitive disorder; mild cognitive im-
pairment; neurodegeneration
1. Introduction
Metacognition refers to our knowledge of our own abilities and attributes; how good
you are at certain tasks and where you may struggle. We use metacognition everyday—
when estimating if you need to write down an appointment or shopping list, or when
deciding to delegate a DIY task to a professional [1]. People with dementia often experi-
ence altered metacognition—this is also commonly called anosognosia, reduced insight, or
altered symptom awareness [2]. Affected individuals may deny having memory problems,
or continue to operate household appliances and drive despite not being safe to do so.
There is emerging evidence that metacognition may be affected even in the early stages of
prodromal neurodegeneration. Those with mild cognitive impairment (MCI) and impaired
metacognition are more likely to progress to future dementia than those with intact aware-
ness [3]. How metacognition for different cognitive domains changes over the course of
neurodegeneration is unclear, and is an understudied topic.
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There is an increasing push towards early diagnosis of dementia, and a focus on iden-
tifying those with prodromal neurodegeneration. A particular challenge in the cognitive
clinic is making an accurate, aetiologically-based diagnosis for those with mild or vari-
able cognitive symptoms. Potential causes of self-reported symptoms include prodromal
neurodegeneration, the side effects of cognitive toxins, primary psychiatric diagnoses,
and Functional Cognitive Disorder (FCD) [4]. FCD can be defined as a presentation
with persistent, distressing subjective cognitive symptoms with demonstrable internal
inconsistency—manifesting as either significant variability in ability, or an incongruence
between self-reported difficulties and performance in everyday life or neuropsychological
testing [5]. For a diagnosis of FCD there should be no evidence of a neurodegenerative,
psychiatric, toxic, or systemic cause for the cognitive symptoms. FCD is an emerging
diagnostic entity, and as such, the diagnostic criteria are in a state of evolution. Functional
disorders are extremely common and can manifest in a wide array of bodily systems, with
Functional Neurological Disorder being frequently diagnosed in the neurology clinic [6].
The underlying root cause for FCD is not yet clear, although in some patients a clear link
with stressful life events or excessive concern about future dementia may be present. Why a
gulf between perceived and real-world performance emerges is unexplained. One potential
reason for the disconnect between perceived and actual cognitive functioning in FCD is a
deficit in metacognition. In this instance, unlike the lack of symptom awareness seen in
neurodegeneration, individuals over-estimate the severity of their cognitive symptoms.
Theoretically, therefore, a measure of metacognitive efficacy may be able to distinguish
people with MCI due to early neurodegeneration from those with FCD.
There remain many unknowns regarding human metacognition. It is uncertain as
to whether perception of our cognitive abilities is specific to different cognitive domains
such as memory (domain specific metacognition), or if we maintain an overarching view
of our functioning at a global cognitive level (domain general metacognition) [7] or both.
Task difficulty and individual performance will also influence one’s estimation of ability
and accuracy. One approach to evaluating metacognitive accuracy is to capture trial by
trial performance and confidence on a single domain cognitive task of varying difficulty.
An individual who correctly evaluates their performance demonstrates highly effective
metacognition, whereas one who under or over estimates their ability can be said to
have impaired metacognition. Signal detection theory has been applied to the problem
of dissecting metacognitive efficacy from performance [8]. The meta-d’/d’ ratio returns
a quantitative measure of how well confidence levels differentiate correct and incorrect
responses.
We hypothesised that people with FCD would show impaired mnestic metacognition,
with a tendency to under-rate their performance, whilst those with neurodegenerative
MCI (nMCI) would over-rate their abilities. This hypothesis is based on the inconsistency
between self-reported cognitive functioning and performance in FCD [4,9]. This is similar
to the discrepancies seen in other functional neurological disorders—people with functional
tremor over-report the presence of tremor, as measured by wearable actigraphy [10]. People
with functional weakness may report lower limb weakness that is inconsistent with their
ability to walk [11]. Therefore, we hypothesised that when directly assessed, people with
FCD would under-rate their own cognitive performance.
In contrast to this, people with dementia very often show a lack of insight into their
memory and thinking symptoms [12]. Altered insight has also been demonstrated in people
with MCI due to neurodegeneration, and may be an early indicator that the individual is at
high risk of progressing to dementia [13]. This led to the second part of our hypothesis,
namely that those with nMCI would show an excess of confidence in their performance.
FCD and nMCI were compared with a healthy control group with metacognitive
efficacy, confidence, and performance accuracy evaluated across memory and perceptual
forced choice tasks.
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2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Participant Selection
Participants with FCD or nMCI were recruited from a specialist NHS tertiary referral
cognitive disorders clinic. Diagnoses were made by a cognitive neurologist, following
clinical assessment, neuroimaging, and neuropsychological assessment. All diagnoses were
reviewed at multidisciplinary meeting involving three cognitive neurologists, a consultant
neuropsychologist, and specialist nurse. All except one participant were clinically assessed
on at least two occasions. In addition, one participant with nMCI was recruited from
Join Dementia Research; they were diagnosed at a different NHS cognitive clinic and
their clinical assessment reviewed by a consultant cognitive neurologist (C.P.) prior to
participation in the study.
A diagnosis of FCD was made based on the presence of persistent, severe self-reported
cognitive symptoms, with a marked discrepancy between symptoms and observed or
reported good everyday cognitive functioning. Additionally, no evidence of an alternative
diagnosis was found, and there was no evidence of progressive deterioration.
nMCI was diagnosed in patients with mildly impaired cognition on neuropsychologi-
cal assessment, with preserved everyday abilities and evidence of underlying neurodegen-
eration (based on neuroimaging findings and a progressive decline over time).
Age-appropriate healthy controls (HC) were recruited from a local database of volunteers
for cognitive research, and from Join Dementia Research (https://www.joindementiaresearch.
nihr.ac.uk/, accessed on 1 November 2010). All controls were self-described as being cogni-
tively healthy.
For all participant groups, those with major psychiatric diagnoses, toxic or metabolic
causes of cognitive dysfunction, or significant systemic disease likely to adversely affect
cognition were excluded. Those with mild low mood or anxiety, and those using low levels
of potentially psychoactive medication were not excluded where the cognitive neurology
team felt these were unlikely to impact on cognition. This was a deliberate strategy, as such
scenarios are extremely common in the general population, and we wished to evaluate
groups broadly representative of a ‘real world’ scenario.
2.2. Assessment Procedure
Participants completed demographic questionnaires, neuropsychological assessment
and metacognitive evaluation. Neuropsychological battery included the Montreal Cogni-
tive Assessment (MoCA), Test of Premorbid Functioning (UK version), the Prospective and
Retrospective Memory Questionnaire, Hopkins Verbal Learning Task, Trails A and B, and
the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (results reported elsewhere [14,15].
Metacognition was assessed with two alternate forced choice tasks, described in detail
in [16]. In brief, during the memory task, participants were shown 50 English words
on the screen simultaneously, and instructed to memorize as many as possible. Study
time was 30, 60, or 90 s. Participants were alerted when 10 s remained of the study time.
Following the study time, a series of 2-alternative forced choice new/old judgements were
completed. Two words were presented, 1 of which had previously appeared in the study
list. Participants were asked to select the word previously presented. Four blocks of 50 trials
were undertaken (1 block with 30 s study time, 2 blocks with 60 s study time, 1 block with
90 s study time). Following each trial, a screen with a sliding scale of confidence was
presented and participants were instructed to rate their confidence that their response was
correct (scale from 1.00, low confidence to 6.00, high confidence). Performance accuracy on
the task was resulted as percentage correct over each block of study time. Confidence was
reported as the mean rating given over each block of study time.
During the perceptual task, participants viewed a screen displaying two circles con-
taining a variable number of dots (both circles and dots were white on a black background
for maximum contrast). Participants were asked to select the circle they estimated to
contain the most dots. The difference in dot number between the circles was staircased
to ensure that participant performance was maintained at a consistent level (see [8,16]
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for details). Following two consecutive correct responses, the difference in dot number
was reduced by one dot; following one incorrect response, the different in dot number
was increased by one dot. The aim was to establish a consistent performance level for the
perceptual task between different participants. Participants rated their confidence after
each trial (in the same way as for the memory task). Each participant completed 8 blocks of
25 trials. The results of the perceptual task were given as the percentage correct over all
trials, and the mean confidence rating by a participant over all trials.
Practice trials were provided prior to both the memory and perceptual tasks.
Subjective confidence ratings are influenced by task difficulty and performance. In
order to derive an unbiased measure of metacognition, we calculated metacognitive effi-
ciency. In this context this represents the participant’s ability to determine whether their
response was correct or not. Metacognitive efficiency is reported as meta-d’/d’, where
meta-d’ is a measure of type 2 sensitivity (ability to distinguish correct from incorrect
responses), using the same units as type 1 sensitivity (d’; ability to distinguish stimu-
lus alternatives) [17]. Meta-d’/d’ is computed using a signal detection theory model,
as described in [8]. This provides a measure of metacognition that is independent of
task performance, difficulty, and confidence. Under ideal performance conditions, meta-
d’/d’ is 1 (i.e., one’s ability to distinguish between the choices is equal to ability to de-
cide if one’s choice is right or wrong), whereas a result below 1 indicates sub-optimal
metacognition. The MATLAB code used to fit meta-d’ to individual data is available at:
http://www.columbia.edu/~bsm2105/type2sdt (accessed on 1 November 2010).
The Domain General Index (DGI) was derived by subtracting log (Meta-d’/d’)Memory
from log (Meta-d’/d’)Perceptual. The DGI can be used to evaluate differences between
perceptual and mnestic metacognitive efficacy. If no differences are present, the DGI will
be 0, whereas if perceptual metacognition is superior to mnestic, the DGI will be positive,
and if mnestic metacognition is better, the DGI will be negative. Seeking differences in
metacognitive efficacy across different cognitive domains will further explore whether
metacognition is domain specific or domain general.
2.3. Statistical Analysis
Statistical analysis was undertaken using IBM SPSS Statistics version 25. Linear
regression analysis was used for between-group analysis (controlling for age and sex), with
post-hoc comparisons. Participants with mean confidence ratings over 5.5 (of a maximum
possible rating of 6), and/or very skewed meta-d’/d’ results (defined as over 2 or under-2)
were excluded. Alternative tests were used where data did not meet assumptions for
parametric data.
2.4. Research Ethics
All participants provided informed written consent. Ethical approval was given
by the South West-Cornwall and Plymouth Research Ethics Committee, REC reference
15/SW/0298 and IRAS project ID:188539. The study was funded by the BRACE charity.
3. Results
3.1. Participant Characteristics
A total of 21 people with FCD, 17 with nMCI, and 25 HC participated in the main study
(for details see [14]). Of these, the metacognition tasks were completed by 20 people with
FCD, 14 with nMCI, and 23 HC. The demographic and global cognitive performance findings
for participant groups who completed the metacognitive tasks are shown in Table 1.
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Table 1. Group demographics and cognitive functioning (mean values; significant p values in bold).





Female:Male 9:11 8:6 16:7 0.043
Age (years) 57.2 70.6 60.7 0.882 0.003 0.048
Years
of Education 13.9 14.4 15.1 0.48 *
MoCA 23.7 23.6 27.7 0.003 1.00 0.001
* No significant difference across samples found; therefore, multiple comparisons not performed. Sex: Pearson’s
Chi-square. df = 2, Chi-square value 6.28, p = 0.043 (adjusted residual significant for HC only: male-2.3, female
2.3). Age: Kruskal–Wallis with Bonferroni correction. Years of education: one-way ANOVA. = 0.75, df = 56, 2,
p = 0.48. MoCA: Kruskal–Wallis with Bonferroni correction.
3.2. Memory Task Results
Accuracy and confidence on the memory task is shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Memory Task Performance and Confidence.










30 s 60.00 9.43 2.84 0.82
0.63 0.68
60 s 66.10 8.96 3.23 0.78
90 s 64.95 13.60 3.57 0.93
Mean 63.65 7.75 3.19 0.74
nMCI
30 s 62.14 7.98 3.37 0.60
0.94 0.47
60 s 62.86 8.25 3.63 0.50
90 s 66.86 10.58 3.77 0.64
Mean 63.96 9.04 3.59 0.59
HC
30 s 66.87 8.98 3.41 0.75
0.85 0.46
60 s 71.83 8.16 3.70 0.73
90 s 74.96 11.00 4.01 0.60
Mean 71.22 7.19 3.71 0.61
1 Confidence ratings were from 1.00 to 6.00. Note only one value to Meta-d’/d’ is given per participant, using
performance over all trials.
There was a significant effect of group on mean accuracy (linear regression with age
and sex as co-variates, p = 0.02, R 0.410, R square 0.168). Mean accuracy over all trials
differed between FCD and HC groups (one-way ANCOVA, age and sex as co-variates,
F(2, 57) = 4.48, p = 0.003). No other significant between group differences were found.
There was a trend for increasing study time to lead to greater accuracy, but this was
not significant after controlling for age and sex, in either the cohort as a whole or at a
group level (repeated measures ANOVA, Greenhouse-Geisser cohort F(1.81, 95.78) = 2.88,
p = 0.061, FCD F(1.81, 28.95) = 1.35, p = 0.27, nMCI F(1.72, 18.90) = 6.4, p = 0.52, HC F(1.79,
35.69) = 0.49, p = 0.60.). There were no significant between-group differences on accuracy
over 30 or 90 s of study time (linear regression analysis, co-variates of age and sex; 30 s
p = 0.086, 90 s p = 0.133). Over the 60 s study time window, there was a significant effect of
group (linear regression, co-variates of age and sex R 0.431, R square 0.186, p = 0.012). In
one-way ANCOVA (F(2, 52) = 3.68, p = 0.032), these differences were driven by significant
differences between the FCD and HC groups (p = 0.028), and between the nMCI and HC
groups (p = 0.031); there was no significant difference in accuracy between the FCD and
nMCI groups.
No significant between-group differences on confidence were found (linear regression
with age and sex co-variates: p = 0.69; mean confidence F(3, 53) = 0.98, p = 0.41; 30 s
F(3, 53) = 2.23, p = 0.095; 60 s F(3, 53) = 0.75, p = 0.64; 90 s F(3, 25) = 0.49).
Confidence levels were overall higher when greater study time of the stimulus was
allowed (repeated measures ANOVA, F(1.45, 78.83) = 22.47, p < 0.005). At a group level,
confidence was higher with longer study time in the FCD group (repeated measures
ANOVA, Greenhouse-Geisser F(1.58, 25.32) = 6.69, p = 0.007); pairwise comparisons: 30 s
vs. 60 s p = 0.046, 60 s vs. 90 s n.s., 30 s vs. 90 s p = 0.012). In the nMCI and HC groups,
confidence did not significantly increase with longer study time (nMCI repeated measures
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ANOVA, Greenhouse-Geisser F(1.17, 12.81) = 0.46, p = 0.537), HC F(1.59, 31.86) = 4.0,
p = 0.63).
Memory task Meta-d’/d’ (shown in Figure 1a) was not significantly different between
the groups (linear regression analysis controlling for age and sex; F(3, 47) = 0.861, p = 0.47).
Figure 1 shows Meta d’/d’ across both tasks—note that under ideal circumstances Meta
d’/d’ is 1. Meta d’/d’ is calculated using all trials in a task, therefore we cannot comment
on how study time in the memory task impacted on metacognition.
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FCD 63.97 5.55 3.71 0.51 0.50 0.51
nMCI 64.50 2.10 3.43 0.60 0.51 0.40
HC 65.86 1.85 3.88 0.69 0.72 0.32
Participants with very high confidence ratings (over 5.5 out of 6) were excluded
(2 participants from the FCD group, 1 from HC group, and 2 from the nMCI group).
3.4. Domain General Index
The DGI is based on the difference between Log Meta-d’/d’ on the perceptual and
memory tasks. A deviation from zero indicates a difference in metacognitive efficacy
between the two tasks. The DGI was calculated for 20 HC, 11 people with FCD, and 9 with
nMCI (those participants with valid results on both tasks). As can be seen in Figure 2, all
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groups showed higher metacognitive performance on the memory task, giving a negative
value for the DGI (mean values for HC -0.22, FCD -0.26, nMCI -0.27). The difference
between perceptual and memory task metacognition was significant in the HC (Wilcoxon
Signed Rank test, p = 0.02) and FCD groups (Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, p = 0.026), but not
the nMCI group (p = 0.139). There were no significant between-group differences on the
DGI (Kruskall–Wallis test p = 0.952).
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4. Discussion
Functional Cognitive Disorder is a little understood but very co on cause of cog-
nitive symptomatology, particularly in midlife adults [5,18]. Here, we explored mnestic
and perceptual metacognition in well characterised groups of mid to older life adults with
FCD, nMCI, and normal cognition [14]. Our primary hypothesis was that the FCD group
would show impaired mnestic metacognitive efficacy, with a tendency to under-rate their
performance. However, no metacognitive differences emerged between the groups. This
was in the context of weaker performance by the FCD and nMCI groups on the memory
task. The primary difficulty experienced by the FCD and nMCI groups was in completing
the task itself, rather than evaluating their performance.
The FCD group gained significantly in confidence as the study time increased, despite
no significant improvement in performance. The FCD group appeared to show a dissocia-
tion between confidence and performance. Metacognitive efficacy was calculated using all
trials, therefore we cannot comment on whether differences occurred over the three study
time windows. This study was designed to detect differences in metacognition, rather than
in performance and confidence. It would be of interest to specifically explore confidence
in people with FCD—it is possible that differences in self-confidence may be a significant
driver of self-reported cognitive symptoms.
Metacognitive efficacy was lower for the perceptual task than the memory task in
the HC and FCD groups. This supports the idea that metacognition is domain (or object)
specific; that is, one’s self-analysis is specific to the object under scrutiny [1]. An individual
may be highly insightful into one cognitive domain whilst having limited awareness of
their functioning in another [19]. This point is of high relevance to both metacognitive
researchers and clinicians. When targeting research tasks, it is key to specify the object
of interest. The object most affected may vary between different diseases, for example in
behavioural variant Frontotemporal Dementia function and awareness of social cognition
is particularly severely affected [20]. The tasks used in the present study have previously
been administered to people with focal brain lesions [16]. People with lesions to the
anterior prefrontal cortex showed impaired perceptual metacognition despite intact task
performance and mnestic metacognition. This was in contrast to a group with temporal lobe
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lesions, who retained intact metacognition for both perception and memory. The anterior
prefrontal cortex is heavily implicated in metacognitive processing, with evidence from
lesioning and tractography studies suggesting that prospective metamemory is subserved
by the medial prefrontal cortex, and retrospective metamemory by lateral regions [21].
However, it should be pointed out that the perceptual task using a staircasing procedure to
maintain a consistent performance level over multiple trials. It is always difficult to develop
exactly equivalent tasks targeting different cognitive domains, and inherent differences in
task style could be responsible for apparent domain specific differences in metacognition.
How very early stage symptomatic neurodegeneration impacts on metacognition
is debatable. Conflicting evidence is seen across different studies, with some finding
people with amnestic MCI to have intact metacognition [22], and others identifying sig-
nificant deficits [23]. Vannini et al. identified correlations between metacognition and
FDG-PET activity in the posterior cingulate and hippocampal cortices in people with
amnestic MCI, coupled with reduced functional connectivity between the posterior cin-
gulum, orbitofrontal cortex, and the inferior parietal lobes [13]. The spectrum of MCI is
wide, and the definition variable. Most studies (including that presently reported) do not
have a biomarker-based diagnosis, therefore are vulnerable to the inclusion of a mixed
population, some of whom will have no neuropathology, whilst others are in the early
stages of symptomatic Alzheimer’s disease. Whilst we endeavoured to select patients
who had additional evidence of a neurodegenerative aetiology for their MCI, as we lacked
biomarkers in the form of spinal fluid or amyloid or tau PET analysis, we cannot with
certainty classify the underlying disease processes present. The presence of either persons
with normal brain structure, or very limited neurodegenerative changes could explain why
the nMCI group did not show any metacognitive deficits in the present study.
An interesting point arising from the wider FND literature is the possibility of symp-
toms being influenced by lay beliefs. In functional tremor, restraint of the affected limb
may result in the tremor spreading to other body parts, a phenomenon at odds with the
neurobiology of the motor system [24]. A tubular visual field defect can be demonstrated
in some people with functional visual loss, where the diameter of the defect does not
change with distance from the examiner, against optical laws [25]. Abnormal attention
is implicated in functional movement disorders, coupled with abnormal beliefs and ex-
pectations, and an abnormal sense of agency [24]. A potential explanation for FCD is that
there is excessive attention towards minor memory lapses, which are actually within the
normal range of human everyday cognition: walking into a room and not recalling why
one is there; experiencing a mnestic block for a noun, then recalling it later. Abnormal
attention towards these events and an interpretation of these as being significant errors
may represent exaggerated lay beliefs about cognition. Individuals with symptomatic
neurodegeneration typically struggle to recount their cognitive errors, whilst those with
FCD can give a fluent and detailed history [26]. Failure to recognise that excellent personal
narrative ability demonstrates good retrospective memory functioning is a marker of FCD.
There are diagnostic pitfalls for the unwary, particularly individuals with very mild neu-
rodegeneration who may also give a rich history of their symptoms, and those with more
significant symptoms but with a good social façade and convincing confabulation—the
latter can often be identified by their informant’s reaction during the consultation. This the-
ory of misapplied attention in FCD coupled with abnormal beliefs about cognitive abilities
(typically memory) would explain the deficits on performance seen during the memory
task and intact metacognition. Altered attention and an expectation of failure could con-
spire together to impair word list encoding, resulting in impaired performance. Future
work evaluating how FCD impacts on attention would help investigate this hypothesis,
alongside an exploration of beliefs about cognition held by lay people.
Limitations of this work include relatively small group numbers, although these are
not uncommon in the literature. Diagnosis of FCD can be clinically challenging, and
there is no definitive tests for this condition, which will contribute to group heterogeneity
and raise the possibility of misdiagnosis of neurodegeneration. As previously discussed,
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nMCI participants did not have neurodegenerative biomarkers available; therefore, this
group will also be heterogeneous. Diagnoses in both the FCD and nMCI were made after
robust clinical assessment and expert discussion, but cannot be clinically ‘definite’ due
to limitations of diagnostic definitions and available clinical tests. The terminology and
definitions used for FCD are still in a state of flux, but we would hope that consensus
will soon emerge and this will greatly facilitate future studies of the neural basis of FCD.
Finally, participants gave feedback that they found both the tasks challenging. A more
naturalistic task design evaluating metacognition during everyday cognitive tasks may be
more sensitive to change.
In conclusion, this study did not find metacognitive deficits in in groups of well
characterised participants with FCD and nMCI. Performance on a memory task was
impaired in both groups, but perceptual ability was preserved. A dissociation between
perceptual and mnestic metacognition was observed, supporting the hypothesis that
metacognition is domain specific.
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